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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the role of transit management in en-
couraging balanced transportation concepts within the American urban en-
vironment. The concept of public transportation is reviewed from a 
historical viewpoint and from the standpoint o.f potential !or ending the 
virtual monopoly of the automobile.in the realm of personal transportation. 
Specifically, it is suggested that a vigorous transit strategy will per-
mit a community to relieve congestion, pollution, and the entire host 
of evils attendant to th• automobile. This philosophy places a great deal 
of pressure upon the transit manisger to provide services that will attraet 
the public away from the private car. It is suggested herein that the 
theories of mass communications can provide a strategical framework 
within which the transit operator can rejuvenate an urban area's public 
transport systems. 
The author is deeply indebted to a great many people. Certainly, 
without the constant guidance and assistance from my thesis adviser, Dr. 
Walter J. Ward, this study would not have been possible. Appreciation is 
also expressed to the other committee members, Dr. James w. Rhea and 
Lemuel D. Groom, for their assistance in the preparation of the final 
manuscript. 
A special note of thanks is given to the two men around whom this 
study revolves, Joseph Arnn and Fred Gilliam. Their dedication to their 
profession provided the initial inspiration for this study, and the 
author sincerely apologizes for not having the talent and ability to 
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adequately describe how these gentlemen revolutionized the transit in-
dustry. The words could not be found to accurately portray the admiration 
the author holds tor these men. 
Finally, special gratitude is expressed to my parents. whose con-
stant interest in this project has a great deal to do w-lth the fact that 
it was finished. 
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CHARIER I 
A STATEMENT OF THE SITUATION 
Air pollution, trattic safety, congestion, land use, tuel consumption, 
balanced growth--the list ot problems, both real and potential, affecting 
Ame~ca•s urban dweller is varied and growing. Yet all these issues in-
variably are linked to some degree to one increasingly important variable 
in the urban environment: transportation. The realization tM.t the auto-
mobile no longer can be allowed complete dominan~e over an area's trans-
port alternative.a has been gaining acceptance in many cities. 
This growing tendency to re-e.xam.n,. the place ot the private car in 
society bas cMa.ted a ''renaissance" vi.thin the public transportation in-
dustry. The capabilities ot mass transit services to assist in the at-
tainment of a community's transportation goals are often obvious and 
desirable, but the creation of a vUble transit mode has been a difficult 
task in many areas. These difficulties suggest an examination of the tra-
ditions, history, and goals of the nass transit industry. 
A Short History of the Transit Industry 
The American transit industry was born in 1827 when Abraham Brower 
commissioned the construction of a modified horse-drawn stagecoach. This 
vehicle was operated by Brower up and down Broadway iii New York City and 
picked up passengers· at the flat rate of a- shilling a head.l The route 
was an immediate success, and Brower expanded his service with larger 
1 
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coaches he called "omnibuses. " Success of the Broadway run led to the 
creation or a competitive industry in New York and the spread of the 
transit idea to Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore. 2 
Brower's immensely popular efforts in New York soon resulted :ln a 
young, dynamic industry which attracted America's entrepreneurs. l!.ven-
tually, the Broadway run in New York became so crowded that omnibuses rolled 
up and down the street at fifteen-second intervals. Competition for pas-
sengers was keen, and drivers steered wildly in the race for fare-paying 
customers,3 
This early experience led .to a belief that excessive competition was 
wasteful. The industry began to accept municipal regulation in return for 
exilusive route franchises. Thus, mass transit began to serve two masters: 
private interests seeking high profits, and the municipal 60Vernment seeking 
operation in the piblic interest. 4 In future yenrs, the public's interest 
would grow to be, in many instances, incompatib::B with the desire for profit. 
But in the late 1800 1s transit was a prosperous enterprise,1and 
American technology soon freed the operator from the horse-drawn carriage, 
In 1888, Frank Sprague started the first trolley line, an invention which 
closely followed the cable oar. The electrically drawn trolley became 
the symbol of the industry until the motor bus 'Baoame popular in the 
1930's. Trolley lines sprang up in nearly every American city.5 
The first quarter of the twentieth century saw good years for tran-
sit. The trolley routes were new, and young men eagerly sought careers 
in the growing and vital piblic transportation industry. Traffic grew, 
and subway lines began in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston. 
Rail rapid transit became the talk of nearly every major American city.6 
The success of these years covered and left hidden a base that was 
J 
never really sound. Technology had been the key to past successes, 
bringing about cable cars and electric trolleys. Though these inventions 
captured the public's imagination, problems caused by low fares and high 
taxes re•ined. The result was the wide-spread merger of transit com-
panies into single lines. !t.mic~l governments and regulatory bodies 
tumed deaf ears to indaatry problems, forcing low fare structures and 
inventing an endless progression of taxes and fees.7 
The depression affected the transit industry as it did every segment 
of the American economy. By 19JJ, the combined effects of the depression 
and the growing popularity of the automobile slashed annual transit pa-
tronage from a high of 17.2 billion passengers in 1927 to 11.J billion in 
19JJ. Dwindling profits prohibited new equipment, a:nd many companies went 
into bankru.ptcy. A new trend toward publle ownership, originally stimu-
lated by public cries of poor management, was accelerated but confined to 
large urban areas.a 
The Second World War reversed transit's downward trends as the war-
time austerity curbed use of the automobile. An incredible 2J billion pas-
sengers crowded aboard the nation's transit systems in 1946.9 Ironically, 
the crush of new passengers served to weaken many systems. The low •ates 
of tare still made mottemization impossible. wartime needs delayed de-
livery ot new equipnent even when it oould be purchased. The millions of 
passengers crowding on already outmoded equipnent left the industry with 
wom-down systems. 10 
The postwar situation brought about a conversion to a new type of 
transit vehicle--the motor bus. Such vehicles had been the object of ex-
periments for many years, but widespread usage had not been achieved until 
11 12 the mid-thirties. By 1940, the bus was enjoying increasing pop.il.arity. 
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In the eyes of many observers, the abandonment of the old street-
cars and trolley lines prevented the postwar fin~ncial collapse of the 
transit industry. Lewis Schneider has written: 
Almost overnight, an industry with high fixed costs 
of maintenance of way, generation of power, and, in some 
cases, engineering and construction of rolling stock; found 
itself buying stat.ndardized products from a limited group 
of manufacturers, as . well as relieved of the problem of 
maintenance of way .13 
In 1945, the transit industry had $1,570 million invested in street rail-
ways and $566 million in motor buses, By 1962, $229 million transit dol-
lars were in street railways with $854 million in buses. 14 Only 44 trolley 
coaohes were purchased by the industry following 1952.15 
The one-man motor bus prompted savings, as it replaced the two-man 
trolley. Moreover, routes became flexible and could follow popu~tion 
trends into the suburbs. Express service became financially possible, 
and parts inventories were reduced and standardized. But these sav:Lngs 
soon were offset by soaring labor costs and declining traffic. The de-
cline in patronage was severe, and total ridership in 1953 was lower 
than in the depression year of 1933.16 Transit's 4\iture was highly 
doubtful: 
Thus, as transit entered the 1960's the industry had 
come the full cycle, from technological developnent and 
growth under free enterprise, through maturity and some de-
gree of complacency when first threatened by the automobile, 
to a secular declining demand for its product and finan-
cial undertainty .17 
The Respoase to Decline 
i Decline of the transit industry was paralleled by the increasing popu-
larity of private transportation, most notably the automobile. Postwar 
automobile usage in America soared, with correspondingly immense d~ops 
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in public transport activity. The automobile, in the eyes ot many, tapped 
some mysterious sociological base in Americans. Demand tor private mo-
bility grew until it outstripped the nation's street and·highway systems 
and led the federal government to create an interstate highway program 
and to otter grants to local and state governments for highway construe-
tion. 
Re111&rkably, transit managers themselves fell prey to the narketing 
approaches ot the automobile manufacturers. Believing the mar&h of the 
automobile was unstopi:able, transit operators chose not to compete with 
the auto. They contented themselves with attempts to serve declining 
numbers ot people who did not own an automobile or could not drive one. 
Styling the poor, the elderly, and the handicapped as their ''captive 
riders," transit officials saw no need to improve service to become com-
petitive with private modes. 
Transit's non-competitive stance after World war II is not surprising 
when the nature of the product is considered. Unlik~ automobile ma.nu-
faoturers, transit operators cannot store their product or adjust pro-
duotion schedules to •et daily · demand. To be effective, the service 
must be on the streets day in and day out, at precisely the same time. 
Moreover, simply putting the service on the road is a task of incredible 
size, as runs must be timed scheduled, monitored, and adapted to an 
. . 18 
eight hour work day. 
In addition, while the motor bus solved many transit headachea, it 
was no panacea. It accommodated fewer people than a trolley and was lia-
ble to uncontrollable situations, such as traffic congestion. 19 Tradi-
tional transit problems re•ined. Labor costs grew and accounted for 
sixty to seventy per cent of the transit revenue dollar. 20 A peak-hour 
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loading problem grew in dimensions, with as mu.ch as sixty-five per cent 
or the to&&l traffic boarding during the peak times, requiring two to 
three times more equipment than during off-peak hours. In the old days 
of transit, when demand was constant.and inelastic, this problem was solved 
by stuffing people into trolley cars and even letting them hold on to the 
outside of the oars with hand-holds. 21 But this policy was no longer 
viable in an era dominated by the comfortable private automobile. 
As financial problems deepened, profits could be maintained only by 
cutting service and raising fares. Christopher Lovelock describes the 
situation tbuslya 
In • • • many cities, management 1 s response to declining tic-
ket sales was to cut back the number and frequency of ser-
vice in an affort to improve load factors on those remaining 
as well as to raise fares in order to maintain revenues. 
Typically, this reduced patronage still further, and led 
to a vicious spiral whereby more and more people switched to 
their cars as public trans})C?rt services became steadily less 
convenient and more costly,22 
The proliferation of numel!'ooa>and fragmented carriers, a lack of mar-
keting studies on the part of management, and generally low quality ser-
vice conspired to continue transit's postwar declines,23 
Specifically, transit management could be faulted on two counts. 
First, the belief that transit demand was inelastic was hel,d tenaciously 
deppteeenhe;.rentry of the automobile into the aarket. Transit idealogy 
was portrayed by the Simpson and CUrtin Formula, which held that a pas-
senger loss of one-third of one per cent would occur for each one per 
cent increase in fares over a period of three to twelve months. 24 The 
theory did not address itself to the results of fare decreases, and ob-
viously was concerned with effects of fare increases on captive riders. 
The industry's acceptance of the hypothesized inelastic demand factor 
of .JJ bound transit operators to an increasingly non-competitive model, 
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Second, transit officials increasingly excused their poor perfor-
mance on external factors over which they felt they had no control. Citing 
such variables as population trends, changes in land-use, governmental 
policies, topography, changes in employment and work patterns, and the 
iapact_or the automobile, transit managers augued they had no voice in 
the traasportation marketplace, All the variables involved in transit 
ridership. were beyond their control, they argued, and there was nothing 
they could do about it. 25 
. Hiding behind these nearsighted theories of management, transit of-
ficials contented themselves with handling pure:by operational problems. 
Moreover, the movement toward higher fares and less service was con-
tinued. .Between 1920 and 1960, cost of the average transit fare rose 
by a whopping 280 per cent. Dlring the same period, cost of bread rose 
7 per cent, and potatoes 10 per cent.26 And, as service was cut to 
levels which did not serve adequately even the captive rider, the trend 
toward public takeover continued and increased. In many areas, public 
pressure forced the passage of legislation permitting the public takeover 
ot even financially prosperous transit lines. 27 
Hardest hit by the postwar transit decline were the companies opera-
ting in America's medium- and small-sized cities. As profits sank, many 
ot these companies were forced to cease operations, and the movement to-
ward public ownership was long held viable only in larger urban areas. 
By the early 1960's, the twelve largest transit companies, operating in 
the nation's most congested urban complexes, accounted for well over fifty 
per cent of the nation's total transit traffic. 28 Citizens of smaller 
towns and cities, less h&'2pered by smog and traffic congestion, were forced 
to turn to their cars as transit alternatives became increasingly scarce 
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or non-existent. The decline of transit in smaller areas was a major 
reason behind the transit industry's first deficit year being posted in 
1963. The deficit has grown larger ever since and totalled $681 million 
in 197J.29 
The Decline of' the Automobile 
During the sixties, it bacame increasingly clear that only a mas-
sive p11.blio commitment would save the .American transit industry from de-
struction. :Wckily, such an effort appeared forthcoming, as the nation's 
love affair with the automobile was getting a little out of hand. 
As automobiles increased at a rate three times greater than the na-
tional population, tremendous problems arose in the nation's urban areas,.'30 
An entire host of transportation-related problems became critical and 
could often be traced directly· to the growing use or the automobile: 
/'fhe United States is7 facing a transp0rtation crisis, 
one th'at becomes more critical as time goes on, a crisis 
which threatens to overwhelm us while we are standing around 
seeking solutions. Concurrently, we are facing a land-
usage crisis as we face the task of accommodating an addi-
tional halt-million people by the year 2000 in a landscape 
that has been shaped more to fill the needs of the automo-
bile than to fit the needs of man.31 
The cost of tr&nsportation had been growing steadily. Americans 
spend more than 20 per cent of the nation's gross national product just 
to move themselves and their goods.32 The average family spends more on 
tr&vel and trensportation than on housing or clothing. Only food con-
SUJDeS a larger share of the family budget.33 The main component of this 
t1"8vel expense is the private automobile, as the cost of upkeep, main-
tenance, and operation moves steadily upwards. 
Auto congestion has also become an increasingly irritating problem. 
W&lter 01 and Paul Shuldiner have written: 
There is little doubt that the problem of transporting per-
sons and goods in our urban areas is one of the most frus-
trating our nation faces. We stand on the ve~ge of enor-
mous technological advances which will enable us to travel 
at supersonic speeds to distant planets. Yet, twice each 
twenty-four hours, millions of persons battle traffic con-
gestion at s~ds more reminiscent of pioneers in their co-
vered wagons. 
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other problems also reared up in the wake of the auto's popularity. 
Air pollution, perhaps the most ugly and most visible, became a key fac-
tor in the automobile's fall from grace, but was a problem confined mainly 
to large urban areas. less dramatic situations caused more serious prob-
lems in smaller areas. 
"Motor vehicles have a monumental appetite for spaoe--both when 
mvving and when parked," according to Donald J. CUrran. More and more of 
the urban environment has had to be chewed up and paved for the highways, 
pa.rk6'g~lots, and streets necessary for auto travel. The nature of the 
problem is understood only when it is realized that one car takes up about 
as much space as an urban office.36 
In some areas, the auto's demand for space is immense. In Los Angeles, 
approximately one-third of the land is committed to auto parking and ser-
vice activity, and fully two-thirds of the Central Business District is 
so oommitted.37 Thus, .America's cities are consumed with what bas been 
termed the ''transit paradox": transit (a mode that efficiently uses ur-
ban land) declines at a ti.lie when highways (inefficient users of urban 
land) are highly congested and when insufficient land is available for 
relief •38 
The automobile is also a voracious consumer of tuel--a resource of 
questionable supply • 
• • • it the U.S. is to avoid massive economic depres-
sion, we must hold our auto consumption of oil to about 100 
billion gallons per year, or about what we are burning in 
1974. In order to hold this consumption level into the year 
2000 and beyond, gasoline will either have to be rationed 
by the govermaent or in the marketplace via ever-increasing 
prices.J9 
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A whole list or attendant urban problem have been traced to the 
family car. Una.t:bractive commercial strips, for example, are a function 
of the automobile system.40 The list of the detects of the automobile, 
in fact, often seems endless, but can be summarize~ into seven •in areas: 
(1) low street safety1 (2) tends to divide and enclrcle communities 
through highway and expressway oonstructiona (J) immobilizes non-drivers; 
(4) creates congestion J (5) contributes to inefficient land usage J ( 6) in-
creases all types or pollutions and, (?) generally increases the waste or 
precious resources. 41 
Moreover, the cost of the automobile system to the taxpayer is growing 
unrealistic, and t.he impossibility or constructing enough highways has 
been admitted. When the system of federally subsidized highway construe-
tion began, cost estim&tes failed to account for a number of items, such 
aa the amount of tax dollars lost when land was publicly acquired for high-
ways, the withdrawal of land from expansion areas, and the tendency of 
highways to grow obsolete very quickly.42 
Transit's peak-hour loading problem was soon mirrored on highways . 
and expressways, and ''it has been found that the peak to oft-peak ratios 
on urban expressways tend to be in the range of 2.4 to 2.6 to 1 • .#J This 
means highway construction had to be planned to meet rush hour demand, 
while the expansiYe layers of asphalt and concrete went practically un-
used during off-peak periods. Even the straight monetary cost of high-
ways showed a tendency to rise to record levels, and the cost per mile or 
highway construction has gone as high as one hundred million dollars.44 
The realities of the jalblic cost of the auto110bile led to a general 
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decline of highway philosophy in the federal government. Even those of-
ficials involved with the interstate highway progr&n\ were forced to admit 
that costs outweighed the public benefits. Francis G. Turner, former 
Federal Highway Administrator, has stated: 
-
I 
It will not be financially possible, and even if it were, 
certainly not socially desirable, to provide lll the highway 
facilities that would be needed in order to s~tisfy the peak 
period demands. especially in the large urban areas, for all 
the people that want to drive their automobiles.45 
The finances tell the story: between 1921 and 1964, more than $199 
billion was invested by federal, state, and local governments in highway 
construction. Only $115 billion was recovered through user charges.46 
The deficit of the American transit industry has never even approached 
the $1 billion mark during any year. 
The Transit Comieeack 
As the automobile increasingly adopted the role of the environmental 
and sociological villain of the American urban scene, transit management 
began a regrouping. Determining that the political atmosphere was chan-
ging, the transit industr,y began to move for changes in governmental poli-
cie. 
Changes were indeed dae. The governmental decision-aaking process 
had long been acknowledged pro-auto and pro-highway. In fact, through its 
construction of highways and promotion of commuter programs, the federal 
government became a major contributor to the use of the automobile. More-
oTer, the urban exp.J"&ssway program was the recipient of strong lobbying 
support from the American Automobile Association and the Automobile 
Manufacturers Association.47 The result was that highway projects were 
eligible for gr&nts that would cover up to 90 per cent of the to&&l costs, 
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while transit pieojeots were eligible for nothing.48 
Bu.t transit had a cause and deserved a viable pl.ace in the urban 
en'rironment. It held mu.oh potential in the search for solutions to eYery 
aspect ot a city's transportation problems. The fact that tor eyery fifty 
penons diverted to transit nearly thirty automobiles were removed from 
the tr&ttio stream gave transit an appeal to the growing environmntal 
activist groupa.49 In tact, a Y&riety of trensportation objectives could 
be related to trensit, such as: (1) increased equality or access a (2) tm 
sa"lings tor paasengel'8 l ()) sartngs on vehicular ownership and oost tor 
paaeengers 1 (4) increased street satety1 (5) operator benefits from an 
improYed systems (6) increased benefits to non-treneit traftlena (7) in-
creased employments (8) iaproYed land-use pl.&nning1 and, (9) less air pol-
lution and less noise.SO 
Moreover, the role ot the captive rider began to be seen in a new 
light as the belief 1n the universality of the automobile was found to be 
mythical. As point or tact, population statistics revealed that the cap;. 
tive rider minority totaled nearly 26 per cent or the American population. 
B7 1970, it was ••tilated that 4 or every 10 families with average inco• 
lea• than $4,000 a year did not own a car. Many or the automobiles owned 
by the poor were found to be in unreliable conditi0n.51 
The results or ignoring transportation needs ot the poor were found 
to be monumntal. i..ck or pu.blic transit often forced entry into car-
pools, resulting in loss ot flexibility needed to seek new em.ploymnt. 
The result was labor shortages in suburbs while unemployment was rampant 
in urban gbettoes.52 The impact of denying Yi&ble transportation services 
to all segments ot the community became clear when the McCone Comi••ion 
found inadequate pu.blio transportation to b9 a •Jll" c_.. of the 1967 
watts riots. The Commission stated: 
• • • an important factor in the hostility underlying 
the Watts riot was the sense of isolation due to the inade-
quate transportation system right sp&nd. in the middle of the 
most motorized city in the United States. The isolation was 
pervasive, extending even to services intend.ed to benefit 
the inhabitants ot the area • • • .53 
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With such an important story to tell, transit proponents soon found 
listeners. Federal policy was actually altered in 1964, with the flllS&age 
of the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMI'A). The legislation made availa-
ble federal capital assistance grants for up to two-thirds of the cost of 
new equii:ment and taoilities • .54 And after 1965, the federal government 
required all federall.7 fumed tr&nsportatian projects to conform t;o a 
• 
comprehensive urban transportation plan, which considered both the~uto­
mobile and mass transit.55 
The federal legislation made modernisation poss.ible for the first 
time since 1945, and was utilized by the industry's largest operations to 
rejuvenate their systems. But the plight of the smaller operations was 
often not assisted by the more understAnding attit~de of federal pro-
graJllS. Local governments still shoved a high resistance to transit in-
vestment, especially in areas whioh had not adopted public ownership. 
Transit, art.er all, still was considered a private industry, despite the 
growing trend tavard piblic takeover. 
In addition, public otf'ioials could cite four reasons behind their· 
resistance to transit investment: · (1) transit investment is generally 
irreversible; (2) direct financial returns are limited (though indirect 
returns are substantial); (3) the absence of a continuing source of opera-
ting funds {the UMTA legislation provided funds only for capital pirchase 
assistance, not operating subsidies); and, (4) facilities are interlocked, 
prohibiting technological change.56 
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The Development of ".Balanced Transportation" 
Lacking in the urban governmental process was a method of involving 
transit in the local planning process. The automobile had been enshrined 
in local bureaucracies through the profession of the traffic engineer, 
and had been reinforced by urban planners brought up on the old pro-
highway bias of the federal government. With the demand for transit 
reaching new highs, and the realization that public ownership was the only 
means of providing quality transit services, local governments were at a 
loss because no one within the bureaucracy knew anything about transit 
and few wanted to learn. 
In a sense, transit was suffering from its history as a private con-
cern. Always regulated on procedures such as fares and routes, urban 
officials had nonetheless ignored specific operational problems, More _. 
often than not, the trend toward settinh general transit policy without 
\ 
understaading operations left many cities offering transit franch~ses that 
no one wanted.57 
As it became increasingly clear that nearly every city of substantial 
size needed at the very least transit lines which adequately served the 
needs of captive riders, many communities ''bit the bulleb" and adopted 
public ownership of transit facilities. But the traditional structure was 
usually maintained by creating transit authorities or districts set up to 
operate soleJy' for the public good but totally ind&pendent of the regular 
governmental bureaueracy. 
While such arrangements o~en exacerbated transit's traditional prob-
lem or being unable to participate in local planning processes. the inde-
pendent stature also had 1111.ny beneficial characteristics. It left the 
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transit •nager to pursue policies in his own way, unrestricted by a 
local transportation bureaucracy clearly designed to move automobiles 
instead ot buses •. And more importantly, it left the transit manager an 
independent voice which was often used to promote a novel theory called 
''balanced transport& tion. " 
Transit proponents looking for a means of advancing their cause 
knew a way 11Ust be found to involve transit in local planning and policy-
alcing pl"OCedures aa the only viable procedure for securing the neces-
sary operating environ118nt and tax subsidies. They did this by utilizing 
the same language as the planners. 
If we assume that the man-made environment is system-like, 
then we can agree that transportation is a sub-system. The 
transportation subsystem has certain functions which contri-
bute to the efficacy of the ways in which we try to satisfy 
the needs and wants of contemporary urban man • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
We are becoming more and more aware that we can pl.an 
the transportation subsystem ot the envl\ronment. Not only 
can we provide facilities and policies that alleviate prob-
lem, we can plan tor transportation in such a way that we 
can affect other aspects of the environment to optimize the 
functions of the whole system, Transportation serves as a 
key to unlocking both the mysteries ot man's urban worl.9. 
and solutions tor improving it.58 
The attaok also centered on the traditional cost-benefit approach 
long used by urban planners: 
Normal market transactions accustom buyers to think only in 
terms of direct oosts. However, this simple out-of-pocket 
kind of cost-benefit analysis can not be applied to public 
goods like transportation. This is the precise reason why 
most goods become public goods~ In other words, it is the 
costs to the society in general and the benefits received 
by society in general that cast a piblic mantle over ser-
vices like education, police protection, and fire Protec-
tion. Transportation is much the same.59 
Transit had become a 1'd.arlin1" of environmental and social experts 
looking tor a way or stopping the continued growth of the use of the auto-
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110bile. What these proponents hammered home was that the planning pro-
cess had been too one-sided, that it had lacked ''balance" between the 
various modes of travel. According to Gerald M. weiland a 
All too often, transit and highways are treated as competing 
facilities instead or being complementary • • • • Highways 
and transit facilities are not competing for trips, they are 
complementary services and should be planned as such.60 
Transit proponent.a also pointed out that nearly every major policy-
making decision of the past had been pro-automobile and anti-transit: 
Urban officials support shopping centers by investing mil-
lions of dollars in wider feeder streets and elaborate traf-
fic control systems. Why don't they invest less on "jitney 11 
bus fleets which would cruise neighborhoods near the shop-
ping centers to help eliminate the need for firing up the 
family car for a trip of less than 12 blocks.61 
Transit managers, seeing that a viable means of gaining entracce to 
local planning processes had been discovered, rallied to the tune of 
. 
''balanced transportation." They argued convincingly that extensi:~e 
transit developaent would permit the public a choice or transportation 
modes. Only in this manner, it was argued, would it; be possible to di-
vert the public away from the private car. 
What we are saying is that we want a transportation sys-
tem that will allow us the greatest choice possible in the 
environment •••• rA 7 system that does not prohibit ped-
estrian-oriented urban spaces; one that does not cut great 
swaths through neighborhoods (as With destructive express-
ways) s one that offers, as muoh as possible, door-to-door 
transports one that appropriately serves low-density residen-
tial areas, yet does not act as an irresponsive breeder or 
these developnents; one that honors the digni ty,,or man, 
both as a passenger and an inhabitant of the landscape 
through which the system is passing.62 
The point was halll1D9red home by citing the implications or continuing to 
ignore transit: 
The metropolitan area;:;;does not have an alternative to coor-
dinated trasnportation planning, but the results cannot be 
recommended. In the United States, at least until recently, 
the altemative has generally been to rely on the automobile, 
and to adjust transportation facilities to the needs or the 
automobile. Although this has made .Americans the most 1110bile 
people on earth, it has given their cities a problem or al-
most unmanageable dimensions.6J 
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The adoption ot "balanced transportation" theories presently stands 
almost complete throughout the United States. The logic and need for coor-
dinated planning between modes has been accepted by urban planners who 
have often been maligned for the rise of the automobile and its atten-
dant side-effects. Thus, by the mid-seventies, transit has achieved an 
entrance to local planning processes, and public ownership, with its tax 
subsidies, is continuing in popularity. The passage of federal legisla-
tion in November of 1974 permitting operating assistance grants directly 
reinforced transit's public utility philosophy. 
It remains only to convince the public to leave their cars at home 
and use in their stead public transport alternatives. It is this manage-
ment fu.nction which shall form the focus for the rerdainder of this study. 
Specifically, the application or modern marketing to transit operations 
will be discussed along with the viability of a consumer mode choice 
model. Next, basic marketing considerations will be reviewed and the pre-
liminary con8Ulll9r orientation efforts of a transit· agency outlined. Thef'I' 
study will then proceed to the development or more comprehensive theories 
for a marketing strategy and the case study of a single transit agency 
will be continued. The study will then evaluate the potential effective-
ness of transit m&rketing strategies and make various recommendations. 
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CHAPl'ER II 
MAKIMX BALANCED TRANSPORTATION THEORIEs 
OPERATIONALi A MARKETING MODEL 
It could be argued convincingly that, when the transit industry ac-
cepted and utilized the concept of balanced transportation planning, it 
did not tull3 realize the illplioations ot the actions. As explained in 
Chapter I, the in:iustry had responded to its postwar demise by a near 
universal acceptance ot a subsidi•ry transportation l"Ole and emphasis on 
serving only the captive rider. Bala.need transportation theories were 
utilised by most transit officials in their lobbying efforts to secure 
a stronger voice in all areas of governmnt and to ,.....for p.iblio 01111er-
ahip and operating subsidies. Again, transit management was guilty or 
nearsightedness. 
The implication of balanced transportation planning was balanced 
trasnportation usage by the consumer. Obviously, it would do no good to 
build up transit services unless aore people could be convinced to utilize 
them. And this meant luring people away from their cars. It was this 
aspect of balanced mode planning that captuNd the iagination of the 
environmentalists and the urban experts. To them, the multi-mode trans-
portation system was a way of ending the complete dominance ot the auto-
mobile and loosening its ever-tightening grip on America's cities. 
What all this means i• that the transit industry, through its ac-
ceptance of balanced planning model.a, was acknowledging and acc..,ting a 
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moN dynamic role in the tr&nsportation marketplace. Now tr&nsit had to 
ooapete against the automobile for passengers. It no longer could argue 
it was doing its job by sel"Ving the needy, the handicapped, the elderly, 
and those too young to drive. It was this impact of coordinated trans-
portation planning that still is having disruptive effects throughout the 
industry. · 
The Rise of Transit ~rketing 
Transit clearly 'RB, and still is, in a very poor position to adopt 
a vigorous competitive stance. Having originally adopted the ideal or 
balanced transportation solel.3' as a means of changing the governmental 
policies that had plagued them for years, many transit managers resisted 
the idea that they J111St now compete actively against the automobile. 
This resistance is understandable when the situation is clearly un-
derstood. The transit industry traditionally had been production oriented.l 
In addition, ass tr&nsit agencies bad a history of poor product planning 
and an unw1.111ngneaa to invest in market research and extensive promotion. 2 
The declining passenger counts and the trend to public ownership 
had all but ended transit's career appeal to the nation's young, and left 
the industry without a youthful, dynamic inner voice. The old-line tran-
sit manager resisted his new role simply because: he had no experience in 
making his product competitive. The tendency to stand pat and be content 
with pushing for more changes in governmental policy was nearly universal 
within the industry until the early seventies. 
The demand that transit operators enter the open marketplace was, 
inaany case, unique in the transportation business. No other mode of 
transport bas ever been forced to rep1'esent itself both in the public and 
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private sectors of the urban environment. The automobile, for example, is 
represented in the area plamiing and policy-making bodies by the traffic 
engineer and urban designers, and in the marketplace by auto manufacturers 
and their distributors. Of all the people involved in an area's transpor-
tation system, only the transit manager was being asked to both cooperate 
with other modes in planning a balanced transport system and to compete 
against other modes in the open marketplace. These two roles obviously 
hold potential conflict. Mlny managers chose to concentrate on one role 
to the exclusion of the other. 
However, the public was often in no mood to listen to excuses. Having 
gone along with changes in governmental policy, and often having voted for 
the diversion of their tax dollars to transit projects, the citizenry de-
•nded results. And what they wa:bted to see was more people leaving their 
cars at home and riding the bus. 
The public bad a point. ''Unless public transit is well patronized, 
many or the benefits claimed for it will never be achieved," according to 
Christopher Ioveloak, was an obvious answer to reluctant transit officials 
who clung to their old ways. A new era of beneficial government policy 
had been ushered in, and now it was time for transit to show what it could 
do. 
Fortunately, there existed a management discipline that was adap-
table to transit operations and which promised a bright future. The dis-
cipline was marketing--the same tool that made the automobile a national 
sex symbol. 
While it is believed that government support for piblic 
transportation facilities greatly enhances the chance or suc-
cess •••• only a strong consumer orientation on the part of 
management at all states or design, planning and operation can 
achieve this suocess.4 
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Experts were quick to point out the adaptability of modern marketing 
principles to the doubting transit manager. 
Marketing and advertising are indigenous to the American 
economy. And local transportation systems--whether public 
authorities or private firms which..supervise and direct the 
operation ot public transportation facilities--are increasingly 
aware of the need to research and analyze markets and to sell 
their own facilities {which they operate in the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity) in the same way that producers 
ot other cons\lller goods and services do.5 
The acceptance of transit services as a "consumer good," that could 
be •rketed in precisely the same way as other products, has gradually 
spread throughout the transit industry. A few still cling to the belief 
that governmental policy is the. kpy, and point out that more than 2000 
years ago the vehicles of all but the most important citizens were banned 
from the congested streets in the center of crowded cities. 6 But pMU' 
for restricting automobile usage by governmental policy have never gained 
public acceptance, and leave marketing as the only viable tool available 
to transit management for use in the marketplace. 
Modal Choice Research 
Ot course, the transit product has its own set of characteristics 
which have been described by ~wis Schneiders 
The critical difference between a transit and a manufacturing 
company is that the product is an elusive one. It can be pro-
duced at will but never stored, and it is known under various 
namesa car miles, bus miles, or sea:t miles, depending on the 
technological configuration of the company and its standards 
of comfort • • • • InasJ1Uoh as the demand for mass transit is 
confined largely to a few hours per week, and transit's pro-
duct cannot be produced in advance.and stored, it is clear 
that profitable operation is not easy.7 
Fortunately, the discipline of marketing consists of a set of theo-
ries that are adaptable to all product forms. All that was ne~ded was to 
determine the nature of the demand for public transportation. Researchers 
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were beginning to do just that. 
It should be re•mbered that for many years if. was believed even by 
transit officials that demand for automotive travel was based on a set of 
inbereat sociological variables that dould not be affected by the manipi-
l.ation ot the environmnt. People chose their cars over transit, it was 
felt, because it was ''natural" to do so in the Amrican culture. Several 
research efforts, indeed, had confirmed these theories. 
Such findings prohibited the transit industry from utilising mar-
keting techniques, which rely on variable •niptil&tion to achieve results. 
If automobile ridership was a natural phenomenon, it could not be affected 
by the actions of the competition. But more detailed and exhaustive stu-
dies were forthcoming and their results were extremely encouraging. 
• • • theoretia&l considerations and the available empirical 
evidence suggest that vehicle ownership is clearly not an exo-
genous variable, especially overtime. Indeed, the future ur-
ban transportation system •Y itself influence the level of ca!r 
ownership to the extent that car ownership will be affected by 
such factors as (a) the family's travel da•nds, (b) the quality 
of transit sel'Yices, (c) the adequacy or parking facilities and 
street capacities, (d) the developmental patteras of the city, 
etc.8 . 
I 
Moreover, research tended to show that the automobile:!s grip on the 
consumer was psychological, and was not so strong as to prevent a rational 
decision-making process on the part of the consumer. Iswis Schneider points 
out thats 
• • • urban transportation studies have developed correlations 
which indicate that transit can attract substantial numbers of 
automobile drivers it it provides fast, comfortable and conven-
ient service at low oost.9 
Attitudinal su:rveys demonstrated that travel time, reliability, status, 
comfort, and cost are very important factors in travel mode selection. 
Safety was also demonstrated to be an important variable. 10 A survey con-
ducted in the San Francisco Bay area in 1973 revealed that car travel was 
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not perceived by non-captive riders as universally superior to tl'9nsit, 
that it was felt to be more dangerous, more expensive, and slower than 
certain fol'JllS of •ss transit. 11 
These .findings were ot immense importance. Variables such as speed, 
cost, safety, and reliability could be manipulated and, more importantly, 
the possibility of variable manipulation meant modern marketing tech-
niques were adaptable to transit operations. 
A similar research effort was to tie transportation demand to the 
eoonmic theory or "derived demand." Research revealed that Americans 
rarely took trips .for the sake of tavel, that trips were usually taken 
to achieve a purpose, such as shoppig, going to W:.lrk, etc. "Transpor-
tation is .'- • • a derived demand, and so the modal choice decision is pre-
ceded by the consumer's decision to make a journ~y which will satisfy other 
naeds. ,.J,2 Discoveey or the economic nature of travel permitted the utili-
I 
zation ot the analytic techniques of economios.13 This, in turn, ~llowed 
usage of the tools ot modern behavioral science in the creation of a model 
of the transportation mode decision-making process. 
The Lovelock Model 
"A market is an exchange rel&t.ionship between buyers and sellf.trs. ul4 
This definition, devised for the econollliY' in general, holds for the trans-
portation marketplace. The diecipline of marketing is designed to assist 
' the seller in advancing the usage or his product. It encompasses the wide 
range of activities designed to bring markets into being and cause them 
to operate. Two distinct activities take place within a markets co:mmuni-
cation and exchange. Sellers are the prilBry active units, as they use 
communications to develop products and promotion progr&ms that attempt 
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to anticipate the demands of the consumer.15 
As modern marketing emphasizes An active role on the pert of the sel-
ler, it becomes necessary for the transit manager, in adopting marketing 
pre.cticea, to shed traditional inelastic demand theories and enter the 
marketplace with vigorous consumer-oriented strategies. What must be 
realized is that marketing involves all aspeQ'ts of operations, and neces-
sitates adapting service, fare policies, equipment, routing, and all other 
acti'ti'ties on the basis of demand. This forces the adoption of communi-
cations systems with the consumer that will permit the precise determi-
nation of consumer desires. 
Such oo.mmunication channels are hard to establish for a diversified 
audience. "In short, •nagement•s task appears to be to plan and imple-
•nt integrated rarketing strategies keyed to the varying requirements of 
its custo•rs," is how Lewis Schneider describes .the situation. 1;6 ot ·key 
importance is the identification of target groups or potential users and 
then the effective marketing of services to these groups.17 This requires 
a •ssive effort to secure information on consumer demand, and the de-
velop19nt or methods to interpret that information. 
The primary component in this type of collllllWlication becomes a sim-
'1• recognition and acceptance of the size of the audience and its varying 
de•ndsa 
While commonplace in the retail business, the transit market 
has rarely been viewed as a highly stratified phenomenon con-
sisting of clearly discemible, distinct, and often widely dif-
ferent gl'Oups of users. However, by viewing it in this •nner, 
the theory of tr&nsit user groups evolved that recognized the 
diversity of interests and corresponding composition of groups 
ot persons who are, or who could become, transit patrons.18 
This realization is the first step toward the acceptance of a model 
of consumer demnd that will guide transit marketing policies. Such mo-
~\ .. ·, . 
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dellng procedures are important for their ability to coordinate •nagemant 
activity, and also because they permit a systems approach which emphasizes 
the utiliz•tion or a variety of procedures and disciplines. 19 Such a 
wide-range or approaches are necessary for a diversified audience. 
The di.ersity ot interests existing in the audience also suggests an 
approach that would emphasize the individual consumer, and modelling pro-
vides just such a framework. 
A particular advantage of modelling from the perspective of 
tl"&nsportation research is that the consumer behavior models in-
tegrate psychological and social-psychological variables, ena-
bling one to examine the role of attitudes, perceptions, etc., 
in the modal choice decis~on process.20 
Christopher Lovelock has developed a model of consumer mode-choice 
that is acceptable both for its simplicity and its emphasis on the indi-
Yidua.l consumer. The model ,is shown in Figure 1. 
As hypothesized by this model, each trip baa a set of chaJ"&cteristics 
which affect the consumer's decision on the mode of transport. After the 
consumer has specified these characteristics, he goes on to evaluate his 
needs on the basis or bis own personal characteristics, past.~:-experience, 
and values and attitudes. 
Now the consumer can move on to a search and evaluation process. 3n 
the basis of his attitudes and past experience, the potential traveler 
searches the modal pool for the form of transportation which ideally meets 
his needs. It is important to note that not all forms of tJ"&nsportation 
are considered, but only those the consumer chooses to evaluate. 
The con8\1Dl8r continues his evaluation of potential modes, and the key 
variable now becomes the &JIOU?lt of intormation in his possession about 
each method of transportation. He •Y choose to seek out additional in-
formation, permitting him to update bis knowledge. But he •Y choose not 
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Figure 1. The Lovelock Model of Transportation Mode Choice 
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JO 
to seek additional inputs or be thwarted in the search, resulting in a 
high risk or not making th• best decision. 
A comparison process now occurs in which the consumer evaluates each 
mode in an attempt to match it to the ''ideal" form created in his mind. 
It a match results, the conSWMr is expected to take the trip; it' not, he 
can either decide to postpone the trip or change his perceived needs in 
hope of achieving a match. Such a re-evaluation of needs could take the 
form of JIOdifying the ideal, altering the nature of the trip, or intro-
ducing new modes into the llOdal pool. 22 
Managerial Implications or the Model 
The Lovelock !t:>del provides a viable framework for transit narketing 
at:retegy, defined aa, "The set of pricing, market research, proaotion, 
and product planning policies designed to stimulAte the pat~ge of ass 
transit.n2.3 Clearly, all phases ot tre.nsit operations are affected by the 
adoption of a marketing strategy, for all activities have an affect on 
consumer demand. The condition of equipment, the politeness of drivers, 
the method ot responding to tel.ePhone intorstion requests, the scheduling--
every policy established by a tre.nsit •nager affects the values, attitudes, 
and knowledge of' tre.nsit held by the public. 
The model described above, then, requires a total marketing orient&-
tion on the part ot •nage•nt, and a ftVersal of traditional production-
oriented philosophies. No long•r can the profit and loss tally be per-
mitted total dominance over tre.nsit policy, for the need to compete •kes 
•ndatoey the determination and acknowledgment or con8Ulb9r demand. Chri•-
to:Pi•r Lovelock bU written 1 
Before a person can uae transit, he llllSt know an alternative 
to the auto existe, and perceive transit's characteristics as 
meeting his needs as well or better than the car. This means 
transit managers must find out what the consumers' needs are, 
design the system to be competitive with the auto, and then 
market the 1Jystea in a way that consumers will know it.t•exists 
and perceive it as competitive.24 
Jl 
This approach emphasizes two management tasks. First, the personal 
characteristics of the consumer, his values, attitudes, and experience, 
must be altered to permit the invlusion of transit as a viable alterna-
tive to the private car. This involves a concentrated piblic relations 
program designed to upgrade the ''image" of the transit system through the 
use of modem equiprient, reliable schedules, graphics, and so on. Se-
condl.y, a multi-faceted information campaign 111\lst be prepared so as to 
permit the transit system to respond when the consumer seeks more know-
ledge in the decision-making process. Such infor~tional materials should 
cover all aspects of utilizing the system. 
This natural dichotomy of management functions provided by the Love-
lock model can serve as a guide to the formulation of all management poli-
cies, from service planning to design of printed schedules. But the foun-
dation for all marketing programs rests on a strategy formulation function 
designed to provide a communicationechannel with the piblic which will 
guide the manager to make decisions which oonfor~ to the extent possible, 
to consumer demand. It is to assist in the creation of just such a 
strategy that the re~t of this volwne will concern itself. 
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CHAPI'ER III 
TOWARDS A MARKETING STRATIDY 1 PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Adoption ot the Lovelock aodel as a Mn&gement tool 9y a transit 
agency should not be considered a light decision or easily accomplished 
task. The acceptance of the model requires a complete restructuring of 
the traditional transit philosophical structure. The belief that the 
automobile is a superior form of transportation that is somehow "fated" 
to prevail over piblic transit must be abandoned in favor •f a •rketing 
ideaeogy which emphasizes transit anagement as the crucial factor in al-
tering the basic tr&vel habits of the public. 1 
The first step toward imple•nting a marketing appreach is the crea-
tion of a marketing str&tegy comprising a set of policies keyed to spe-
cific objectives. 2 It is the pirpose of this chapter to begin to discuss 
the factors de•nding oonoern in the creation or a marketing strategy by 
analyzing the approach of a single transit agency, the Matropolitan Tulsa 
Transit .Authority. 
General Considerations 
or basic importance i• the realization that transit marketing requires 
! 
an .intense effort which finds few parallels 1 1n the marketplace. As a.,y 
A. !tmdy has written1 
What some transit marketers have already discovered from 
trial and error is that their •rketing str&tegy is not •rely 
persuading an individual to invest35 cents and try it, but, 
rather, to change a segment or his or her very own Ji re. sty~.3 
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The overriding consideration is that the automobile, for a variety or 
reasons, has become a transportation institution in the United States. 
Any attempt to dislodge the auto from its position ot superieldty must be 
well planned and smotllel,y instituted. This tact •kes •rketing or cru.~ 
cial importance, as it i• ''the only manage•nt function which links di-
NCtlY the transit company and the general piblic--both riders and non-
riders. ,,ff 
The tar-reaching nature or the transit goal of taking passengers away 
from the autoJ10bile requires a broad concept or •rketing. In the words 
ot R&y Mundyt 
Ot primary illportance is the need tor transit executives ~o 
broaden their concept ot •rketing and marketa. Far too many 
transit executiTe• are under the misconception that marketing 
•ans advertising and little elee • • • • A marketing strategy 
involYes product ottering&, price, research, and delivery sys-
tem decisions also.5 
It is necessary, then, tor the transit marketi.nk strategy to be suc-
cesstul, to adopt the Lovelock model not only as an explanation tor con• 
•umer behavior but also as the dominant theoretical basis tor every ,, -~ ;'. 
•nage•nt decision. The consumer becomes the dominant concem ot the 
anager, overriding strictlY operational concerns. 
It •y be hypothesised that, in tarms of the consumer, the automobile 
is a superior alternative to the transit product in the attributes ot pri-
vacy, comfort, orientation, and convenience.6 To these characteristics 
•Y be added the qualities of quick travel time, no waiting time, freedom 
from schedules, and reliability.? Of course, not all these variables •Y 
enter into the mode-decision •king process of an individual consu.r, but 
one or more or these characteristics .,...Y rorm~hae basis ot a transportation 
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modal choice.on the part or a potential transit passenger. 
In te1"118 of the Lovelock model, it appears the all-important consu-
mer function in the transit marketing strategy is the process of matching 
the characteristics ot all available modes against the traveler's own 
conception of the ''ideal" form. As transit is competing against the auto-
mobile 1n the mind or the conaUJl9r, the characteristics or each mode ~ 
perceived by the C0_!1SUlle_! become the predominant factor in the fi.Ml choice 
of the form ot transportation. 
FUrely economic considerations do not appear to be overwhelmingly im-
portant. From past behavior, it is known that ''the consumer is perfectly 
willing to spend three, tour, and even ten times as much money on a given 
functional product to achieve higher levels of performance, status, com-
fort or appearance.8 
Since ecmiomics appears to be relatively unimpok-t&nt, the key para-
•ter for describing the transit product would appear to be speed, com-
fort, convenience, and aa.f'ety. 9 To these may be added the component of 
oolllllUlity concern1 
llthough the automobile is a remarkably useful mode, clearly 
it is not alwaJ'S the best or most appropriate mode, particularly 
when viewed from a comunity, rather than an individual, stand-
point.10 , 
The transit marketing goal is, then, to allow a traveler a choice or modes 
and to encourage the mode that is best for him and the community.11 In 
many cases, a significant upgrading or existing transit services uy be 
necessary to achieve equality on the·mod&l attributes deemed important 
by the consumr.12 
Marketing bas been detined Ma·~ ¥the process of matching consumer needs 
and the firm's resources. ,.1) In order to achieve this goal, •rketing 
strategies are usually outlined in terms of four variables--product de-
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velopment, promotion, price, and distribution channels.14 A specific stea-
tegy combines or weights these elements in a way that will allo~ the firm 
to achieve its goals of profits, sales, and larger market share.15 The 
needs of transit marketing differ little from this general approach, though 
the specific requirements of this industry are often uncommon. 
Transit marketing is unique in that there may be several 
alternative means to obtain a similar end, i.e. the "*rketing 
Mix" may have a variety of components and differential weights 
or emphasis.16 
The task of the transit marketer is to define the goals of his agency 
and then blend the elements of the marketing mix in such a way that the 
attainment of these goals becomes possible. 17 The main difficulty with 
this general paradigm is that the transit marketplace is composed of a 
wide variety of consumers. 
In practice, ••• pu.blic .transportation has to be designed 
to serve a large number of different market segments whose 
needs and characteristics may differ quite widely from one 
another.18 ° 
This means the transit manager must compose different strategies for each 
market segment. In other words, a different marketing mix my be required 
for each sub-group in the community. 
These factors necessitate the identification and location of indi-
vidual market segments. And, once the elements of the audience are de-
fined, the t:r&nsit marketer must establish a meaningful relationship with 
the consumer as a basis for a flow of influence.19 The words, pictures, 
numbers, and gestures that are accepted by each market segment must be 
discovered and utilized by a marketing colllJllUnicator.20 
The considerations discussed above obviously point to the immense 
size of the transit •rketing task. When combined with the traditional 
superiority of the operational !unction, the complexity of the require-
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ments illlposed by an adoption of •rketing expl.Alins the discipline's slow 
rate of acceptance throughout the transit industry. Also expl.Alined, per-
haps, is the general equation within the industry or marketing with the 
isolated taak of promotion. 
Such an attitude is dangerous because it permits no expansion of the 
management function and suggests a reliance on advertising agencies. This 
is unfortunate because such agaicies are not equipped to perform basic 
marketing decision-aaking functions. An advertising agency is designed 
to assist a client with decisions as to uses for the various media along 
with me~sage content and form. .But the primary decisions involving the 
components of the marketing mix cannot be i:;prrormed by an advertising 
agency and llU&t, of necessity, be made by a transit management staff 
that is designed to pefform the marketing function. 21 
Another inherent defect with a reliance on an agency is that such a 
course often retards non-promotional areas of management • 
• • • it must be remembered that much of an ~IJenoy's com-
pensation comes from a percentage of the media used cost. 
Thus, there is a built-in impetus to emphasize 11proJ10tion" as 
opposed to product develo,P119nt, research, pricing, or sel"Vice.22 
The most important element of a marketing strategy, product planning, 
might be totally ignored it a transit manager were to rely on an agency 
for marketing decisions. Such an outcome would be totally unacceptable. 
If the tour •in oharacterilitics-of transit upon which transit is compared 
to other aodes--speed, com.fort, convenience, ana sarety--are remembered, 
it becomes clear that promotion is only one aspect or an effective marketing 
strategy. 
Only a complete acceptance of •rketing methodologies, therefore, will 
permit the transit manager to establish effective communication channels 
with the pllblic. The marketing strategy must be devised and implemented 
at the staff' level, and has been defined by Lewis 3chneider: 
A transit •rketing strategy will be defined as a set of 
market research, product planning, pricing, and promotion poli-
cies designed in acoord&nce with basie objectives relating to 
the volume ot traffic desired versus the coat of providing the 
service. A sucoesstul strategy will require a ''mix" or poli-
cies keyed to the differing requirements of the wide variety 
Of ''triP-takers" in the urban COlllllUni ty • 2.) 
A Case Study 
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The Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority (Ml'TA) or Tulsa, Oklabo-., 
provides an excellent example of a transit 'fY'Stem which abandoned tra-
ditional public transportation concepts in favor af a consumer viewpoint 
and the Lovelock model. The Ml'TA experience provides credibility to both 
the effectiveness and desirebility of transit marketing strategies. 
The MrTA is the principal mass transportation carrier iri the city of 
Tulsa. It is owned and operated by a public authority created to serve 
the City of Tulsa iri &he cai:acity ot a public trust. The system, in-
cluding all equipment and propel"ty, was purchased by the city in 1968, fol-
lowing a labor dispute between hourly-rated employees and the previous ow-
ners ot the system, the Missouri-Kansaa-Oklahoma (MK&O) Transit Line. 
This dispute led to a strike and the abandonmnt of intra-city transit in 
Tulsa by MK&O. 
In order to insure the continuance ot public transit in Tulsa, the 
city created the Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority and turned over to 
it all equipaent, supplies, and pro:p9rty. The Authority settled the wage 
dispute and restored service after a two-month strike period during which 
the citizens ot Tu.ls& were completely without bus serYioe. 24 
DJ.ring the first year• ot its existence, the M'rl'A generally sought 
a continuation or the routes and policies established by MK&O. No new 
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bus lines or l'OUte llOditic&tions were accomplished. To finance the in-
creased wage settlement with its union employees, the Authority adopted 
an increased tare structure and reduced midday service. 
The inadequacy of the Ml'TA tare structure and service level became 
increasingly apparent as each succeeding month passed. Passenger levels 
~· 
dropped to abyaal levels. As tarebox reYenues declines, subsidies from 
the city's general tax revenue funds were required to keey Hl'TA bllses run-
ning. The size of these subsidies continued to grow.25 
Table I indicates the static nature' of Ml'TA se!"rices as measured 
by mileage counts, and the downward·trend ot passenger traffic. 
TABIE I 

















*Estiated. Figure tor 1968 not '1 
available. 
Source a Metropolitan Tulsa Transit 
Authority. 
MrrA 11s problems were easy to diagnoses services had been allowed to de-
cline to vhol]Jr inadequate levels. Midday buses were available only on 
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four routes, and Saturday service was restricted to these same routes lfi.th 
one- to two-hour waits between buses. The rolling equipment was in ter-
rible condition, many bllses showing r11sty exteriors and the results of 
unrepaired traffic accidents. Bus interiors were usually dirty, the seats 
tom, lfi.ndod often broken. .Maintenance was held off in attempts to lower 
opar&ting costs. 26 
By tar, the moat devastating of .Ml'TA's deficiencies concerned the 
nature of its route system. Tulsa's growth patterns have been dynamic, 
though imbalanced. The city's exj».nsion, however, was not mirrored by 
Ml'TA 1 s scheduling and routing procedures. Bus routes had undergone only 
s•ll changes dictated by pirely oparatioMl considerations such as street 
condition and traffic flow. The result was a rout... system that aid not 
co• near •ny of the newer residential. and employJ.nt centers.27 
The inadequacy ot Ml'TA's route services made many Tulsans "auto ... 
captives." As there was for •ny residents no available p.iblic transpor-
tation altemati'V'e, the only conceivable form of transport became the auto-
mobile. Thus, it was not necessarlly the distinct advantages of auto-
mobile travel that led to its widespread use in Tulsa; but, rather, the 
absence or inadequad; of p.iblic transportation services. 
By 1972, it was clear that something had to be dona if the m'TA were 
to sul"Vive. The iMbility ot the tr&nsit authority to attract new pas-
sengers led •ny obsel"Hrs to predict the eventual extinction of transit 
in Tulsa. Many Authority •mbers piblicly espoused a prediction that 
transit would soon prove too expensive a service for the city to provide 
and would soon be phased out entirely. 
The Authority eventually adopted this idealogy officially. In &P-
pl.ying for a captial grant frm the Urban Mass Transportation Administra-
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tion ot the federal Department of Transportatinn, the Ml'TA proposed to re-
plaoe its wom-oul" 45-passenger buses With JJ:..;;seat models. No plan for 
application other than a request for cosmetic improvements such a~ bus 
shelters along with new •intenance and route &upervisory equiJ119nt. 
Clearly, the Authority was predicting that the passenger decline would 
continue, as evidenced by the decision to buy smaller buses. 
The sequence of events leading to the eventual demise or the M'l'TA was 
interrupted suddenly in January ot 1972. At that time, the Authority 
named as its Executive Director a 65-year-old trankit veteran named Joseph 
Amn. Arnn had a lif'eti.lla or experience in the tr&nsit industry, He also 
was one or the few men in the United States who espoused an active •rke-
ting and public Jttility role tor mass transportation. Arnn theorized that 
the d••nd tor transit was subject to the same •rket conditions that exist 
tor every form ot transportation, and turther believed he could reverse 
Tulsa's history of transit decline by adopting a •rketing strategy. 
Amn's basic approach to transit •rketing involved the adoption ot 
an econollic fr&mn'ork tor consumer de•nd which was used in most commodity 
industriess 
• • • the modern theory or consu.r behavior is based on the as-
sumption that the consUll8r allocated expenditures on coJlllOdities 
as if he bad a fixed, ordered set of preferences, described by 
an inditterence •P or by an ordinal utility function, that he 
Jpl.Ximizes subject to constraints imposed by the income he re-
ceive• and the prices he must pay.28 
In addition, this theory bas been modif'ied by several authorities to in-
clude the prospect or variable consumer choice by assuming learning be-
havior might take place on the part of the consumer. Such things as ad-
vertising, price policies, promotion, and creation of new products •Y 
cause shitts in consumr prererences.29 
A.mn's embracing of general •rketing principles and economic 110dels 
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of consumer behavior mt both a disbelieving community and a reluctant 
Authority. Nenrtbeless, Arnn argued successfully against the purchase 
of s•ller buses and persuaded the Authority to remin with larger buses. 
Tha key element iri his argument proved to be the .lower over-all operating 
and •intenance ~oats of large buses rather than the promise of an up. 
swing in passenger de•nd. 
Arnn re•ined as director of the Ml'TA for eighteen months, and this 
period can be reflrred to as Ihase I of the Ml'TA marketing stratea. Arnn 
was handicapped by four overriding considerations: (1) a generally poor 
; 
fleet which could not be replaced i.mmediately due to a long delivery ti.E 
for new buses; (2) an outmoded route system previouE!ly described1 (3) a 
total absence of funds for •rketing and promotional activitya and, (4) 
a high rare structure set up on a complicated zone system. The combina-
tion of these budgetary and system characteristics"' Arnn felt, effectively 
undermined MTTA's potnetial customer appeal. 
Arnn correctly judged that direct advertising and promotional poli-
cies should be avoided. The very poor state of the service precluded 
such activities since any advertising that mentioned "good serv1ce" or 
"comfortable travel" would be mis leading and might backfire. Several 
studies have confirmed Arnn's assess•nt. A study in Pittsburgh, for 
exaaple, oonolucled that unrealistic transit advertising led to an in-
creased decline in passenger traffic.JO 
Amn's min approach was to adopt an informal public relatioas program 
that would emphasize the potential of the transit concept rather than a 
direct promotion of the Ml'TA system. Again, Amn was basing his atrategy 
on solid theoretical ground: research in Denver had shown the public of-
ten thought of a public agency as slow, bureaucratic, and politically 
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oriented.Jl Arnn'• reliance on the. appeal ot the transit concept ewer a 
pire Hl'TA. orientation •• based upon this ty,pe of research finding. 
The piblio relations progrua designed by Arnn was established along 
the lines of the two-step flow theoey or oomunioations. Thi• model aug-
ge1ts that there ia an interMdial'J between the source ot a ••••ge and 
the piblio. This intermedia17 is often referred to as an "opinion leader," 
and is credited in theory with aking possible the complete dissemination 
or a •••age. The paradigm suggests a •ssage is first received by an 
opinion leader who judges its •rits and then deoides wheteher it is wor-
thy ot d18sellin&tion. The opinion of the leader, according to the theoey, 
bas • great deal to do with how the ••sage is received by the general 
piblic.32 
The concept ot opinion leadership is widely used in •rketing, but 
usual.l;y only as a prediot1• device. There is a veey high cost involftd 
in finding and isolating th••• leaders)) This coat prnented Arnn f'roa 
atteapt.ing to isolate Tula&'• opinion leaders. Instead, he concentrated 
on the obvious networka ot interpersonal communications hoping hi• ••-
sap would somehow tind the opinion leaders. This technique •s also 
baaed upon basic •rketing theory.34 
Amn struck. out on a one-•n p.iblic relations campaign that was to 
invade every.corner of the city ot Talsa. Hi• emphasis was on downtown 
•l'Ohants and eaployers. He exhorted •rohants to give their custo•rs 
tree bus rides in the aaae •rmer in which they offered tree parking. He 
begged employers to encourage the use of transit by their workers. He 
•de himelf' available to any club or organisation that would listen, 
and g&ve some 120 •peechea to these groups during the eighteen aontbs he 
•• Dinctor ot the Hl'TA.. He concentrated on mdia relations to the ex-
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tent that he finally won editorial support from all local newspapers and 
broadcast stations. And he gave llllch of his ti.m8 to the MTTA's passengers, 
frequently riding buses to personally ask the public how they thought the 
bus system could be improved. 
These activities consUDled the bulk of Arnn's time, but he also con-
stantly worked to improve operations. He brought to Tulsa and the M'rl'A 
a scheduling expert named Fred Gilliam. Given the title of Operations 
*n&ger, Gilliam was ordered to revise and modernize MI'TA's antiquated 
route system. The result was the introduction of modern scheduling 
practices along with route analysis and revision in every corner of the 
system. Express routes were initiated, a mew route crea•eti, and every 
route lengthened and re-scheduled. 
Arnn also improved maintenance procedures and institut.ed practices 
designed to keep the buses cleaner. He painted the old buses a variety 
ot colors so as to increase their visimility from the street. .Public 
1nfor111.tion actigities were increased by encouraging passengers to call 
Ml'TA with their questions and by the publication of a system-wide ti11e-
table. 
The success ot these activities prompted Arnn to sugsest changes in 
Ml'TA's pricing policies. MTTA bad always operated on a 30¢-)5¢-40¢ zone 
fare system and charged 5¢ for transfers to other lines. This policy was 
overly complicated and, in Arnn's opinion, discouraged transit ridership. 
He argued for a 25¢ across-the-system fare that would abolish zone charges. 
In addition, he advocated a $5-25 ride punch pass which would lower the 
price of a ride to 20¢ for those willing to pay in advance.J5 
The Authority did not approve Arrm's pricing policies until April 
of 1973. Their reluctance was based upon Arnn's admission that operating 
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subsidies would have to continue. He argued that the automobile was sub-
sidized with tax dollars through the construction of streets and highways, 
and that transit must also be subsidized, The Authority clung to a belief 
that the optimu.m transit operation's revenues would cover all expenses, 
but finally agreed to increased tax subsidies and Ai'Tlll' s fare structure. 
Results and Conclusions 
The results of Arnn's efforts indicated strongly that his theories 
and ideas were operational. The 1972 passenger total reached 2.1 millioa, 
compared with the 1971 total of 1.7 million, J)iring :J.973, the passenger 
total reached 2.6 million. The long y;ears of decline were over. 
Arnn left Tulsa in October of 1973. A grateful community filled his 
arms with pla.pies and momentoes. 
With Arnn's departure, Phase I of the MI'TA marketing strategy was 
completed. For, in September of 1973, the last of an order of 45 new 
buses rolled onto Ml'TA property. The new equipment was finally in hand, 
and fhase II could commence. 
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CHAPrER IY 
TOWARD.S A Ml\RKETING STRATEXJY: PHILOSOPHICAL 
AND METHODOLCGICAI. CONSIDERATIONS CONTINUED 
Upon the retirement or Joseph Arnn, Fred Gilliam was na•d executive 
director or the Ml'TA. Although he had co• to Tulsa as a scheduling and 
operations expert, Gilliam had been an attentive student of A.rnn 1s. He 
had become convinced that the basic structure of transit operations was 
a119nable to the introduction of a complete •rketing orientation. 
The date of Gilliam's takeover or the directorship coincides with the 
beginning or the second stage or the MTTA.~s consumer strategies. with de-
livery of new equipment, Ml'TA finally bad a product that could be effec-
~ ... 
tively prollOted. The llOdern, brightly-colored coabhes were capable of 
attracting and holding public interest. Arnn's promises ot faster, more 
efficillnt ael"Vice now bec&Jle possible. 
Gil.U.u was fortunate al.so in that Arnn'• successes had led the 
Authority to approve larger operating subsidies. And, for the first time, 
a significant bUdgetaey appropriation for advertising and promotional 
activity was approved. Gilliaa, then, was able to conceive and execute 
a amrketing strategy immediately upon becoming the .Executive Director of 
the Ml'TA. 
The Basic Idealogy 
As explained in the previous chapter, Arnn's marketing strategies 
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were based upon macroanal.ytic, eoonomic models of consumr deund. Con-
sidering the restrictions placed on his activities, this model proved 
quite functional and highly successful. Gilliam, however, chose to re-
ject this model in favor of more microanalytic theories. With a more 
realistic budget and new buses at band, Gilliam needed a theoretical 
structure that would guide operations through a P1Jriod or general expan-
sion. Whereas Amn 1 s effo?"ts had been designed to cease the passenger 
decline and hold the line against tu.rther reverses, Gilliam's plan was 
to actively enter the market and compete against the automobile. As 
Gilliam explains: 
In the first few days of my directorship, we were total-
ly consumed by the need to modernize and expand transit ser-
vices in Tulsa. Joe Arnn had almost singlehandedly reversed 
the downward trend of bus ridership and this had proved to the 
staff' that signiricant improvements were not only possible 
but essential. But we also knew that a larger Ml'TA would re-
quire a more ambitious oper&ting framework. We lMgan to 
search for aggressive expansion strategies. The end result 
was a complete re-alignment of' both the organizational chart 
and the route system.I 
Gillaim's need f'or "aggressive strategies" led to the adoption of 
the IDvelock model as the guiding force behind the Ml'TA's •rket1'tg stra-
tegy. A copy or the model •s -.de and placed on the office wall so as 
to provide a constant reminder to the staff or the need for a consumer 
orientation to operations. The IDvelock •del completely replaced Arnn' s 
economic-based paradigms. 
This change in philosophical and theoretical frameworks was the sin-
gle most important step in the eventual development. of the Phase II MrTA· 
•rketing strategy. Adoption of the Lovelock model meant an acceP-
tance of psychological and sociological explanationt tor con8Uller behavior. 
Specifically, it led to an adoption of the theories concerning the dif-
tu.sion of' aommunications upon which U>velook had based his model. 2 
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01.rtusion Theory 
A considerable body o:t theory exists within the social sciences on 
the rate of adoption tor a new idea or product b.Y the piblic. It was 
this theoretical foundation upon which Gilliam based the MTTA marketing 
strategy. 
Ot course. transit se'!"'lice does not qualify as an innovation in the 
normal sense of the concept. However, in terms of diffusion theory, the 
revitalization or a tranait system does fit into the category or a new 
or novel approach to transportation. Accorcling to Gerald Zaltman: 
Innovations in marketing may take any of the folloWing 
forms: 
l. DeveloP19nt or a completely new product or ser-
vice . • • • 
2. !Jllprovement ot existing products • • • • 
J. New narkets tor existing goods and services . . . . 
4. Finding new uses for an existing product • • • • 
5. Unique changes in advesiising, m.erchandiatng, poli-
cies, packaging policies •••• 
Technology. then, does not determine whether or not something is an in-
novation. The intended impact upon potential users is the key charac-
teristic. This means a revitalized bus system can be thought ot as an 
innovation and that diffusion theory is applicable to transit marketing. 4 
An innovatinn can be quickly defined as "any idea, practice, or ma-
terial artifact perceiTed to be·new by the relevant adopting unit.".5 
The process by which utilization of the innovation becomes widespread is 
referred to as diffusion: 
Diftusion is the process by which an innovation spreads. The 
diftusion process is the spread of a new idea from its source 
of invention or creation to its ultimate users or adopters.6 
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The diffusion process, moreover, has definite time par'ameters which 
have been discussed by Gerald Z&ltman and Ronald Stiff t 
The diffusion process begins when the first member of the 
population becomes aware of tha innovation and continues 
until the innovation is no longer adopted, eith~r because of 
total adoption by the coJ1111U11ity or non-adoption by some seg-
ments or the population.7 
The key element in utilizing diffusion as a management strategy is 
! 
the realization that the adoption process varies with the individual con-
sumer: 
Adoption is a decision to continue f'ull use or an innovation. 
This definition implies that the adopter is satisfied with 
the innovation. 
The adoption process is the mental process through 
which an individual passes from first hearilig about an in-
novation to final adoption.8 · 
The adoption process can be thought of in terms of separate stages. 
Thoma~ s. Robertson proposes a seven stage '~cceptance-decision" model. 
The seven stages in Robertson's paradigm ares (1) problem-perception stage 
during which the potential adopter realizes a problem, either real or po-
tential, in his environment; (2) awareness of the innovation during which 
the adopter becomes aware of the innovation's potential for solving the 
problem discovered in the first stage a (J) comprehension of the inno-
vation; (4) attitude formulation toward the innovation; (5) the legiti-
nd.zation vi.thin the adopter's value structure of the innovation as the 
proper coU?'se or action; (6) trial stage during which the adopter uses the 
innovation for the ~irst times (7) adoption. Robertson further suggests 
that one or more stages may be skipped during the adoption process and 
that regression can also occur. Dissonance, or the conflict of an in-
novation with an adopter's values and opinions can also occur as another 
stage in the adoption prooess.9 
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or course, an innovation may be rejected at any stage or the adoption 
process. Arter adoption, a rejection is called a discontinuance.10 
or primary importance to the successful diffusion of an innovation 
are the attribates ot the innovation that are deemed relevant by the con-
11 sumer. The literature suggests a variety of characteristics can be 1.ill-
portant during the adoptinn processa (1) cost of the innovation; (2) the 
risk of ridicule, ostracisM, or expulsion from the social system as a 
result ot adopting the innovation; (J) the level of reinforcement for 
using the new product or service; (4) the efficiency of the innovation in 
terms or tim savings or avoidance or discoll:f'ort; (5) the 0011111Unioability 
of the innovation or the ease with which news of its use can be dissellina-
teda (6) the compatibility of the innovation with existing products; 
<•) the degree to wbltii change is required on the part of the consWIBr; 
refe:rred to as the parnsiveness of the innovation; (8) the complexity of 
the new product1 (9) the relative adftntage of the innovation over ex-
isting forms; (10) the degree of visi9ility or salience or the relative 
advantage or the new produot.12 
The Applic•tion of Diffusion to the Ml'TA 
In order to •ke the adoption of a rehabilitated transit product pos-
sible, Gilliam and his staff ana]3zed the Ml'TA system in terms or the 
above list of characteristics. Specific strategies were devised in order 
to increase the transit system's appeal on those variables that would in-
fluence the adoption process. 
Cost 
As bas already been stated in this study, the Ml'TA began a policy of 
lower tares in April of 19?3. This system was ~sed on a 25¢ flat rare, 
a $5•25 ride punch pass, and a free token program sponsored by downtown 
•rohants. To this basic structure, Gilll&m added a 50¢ all-day pus 
that eliminated tH.nster tees and could be used on all lines (except 
expresses) without restriction, and a $J-20 ride pinch pass for use by 
senioi- citizens during the midday and by students without restriction. In 
addition, a program was devised with a local bank which permitted bus 
passengers to use a credit card in lieu of bus tare.~ "Ollr aim," Gilliam 
expU.iris, "was to create a highly diversified fare structure that would 
appeal to eveey seg•nt of a highly diversified public, 1113 
Compatibilit~ ~ Pervasiveness 
In order to make the Ml'TA service comply as closely as possible with 
the public's demand for transportation that was a efficient and relaible 
as the automobi~, Gilliam pioneered and developed a varie.tt of.· tech-
niques. Through a system of "residential routing, " the M'l'TA 1 s buses were 
taken off the main arteries and run through key residential areas. This 
meant that bus passengers for the most part would have to walk only short 
distances to catch their bus. In addition, a ''multi-stop" system was de-
vised which ended the traditional reliance on formal bus stops, Pas-
sengers could board and de-board at any intersection along the route. 
Complexity 
The MTTA eT&luated this cll.aracteristic as one of the prime deter-
rents against bus ridership, Traditionall;v, bus schedules and maps have 
been difficult to read and understand for the general public. To provide 
the potential bus passenger with all pertinent information, the Ml'TA staff 
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created a series or informational pamphlets to supplement the basic route 
schedules. Explaining blls schedules and rare procedures, the publica-
tions were •de available throughout the metropolitan area and were nailed 
to the entire collllllUJrl.ty via city utility billings. In addition, telephone 
information sel"Yices were increased through the addition of phone lines, 
Enry piece or printed information distributed by the MTTA contained the 
phone numbers and a plea to call with any questions conoeming the MTTA.'s 
sel"Vices. 
Relative.Adftntage 
The most important characteristics of an innovation are those which, 
in some way, make it prefe:r&ble in the opinion of the consumer to similar 
produotll or services. In the case of transit the public's views ot the 
relative advantages of public tl'IUlsportation over the automobile very 
clearly are a main determinant in the adoption or rejection of t:r&nsit ser-
vice. Normally• a •rketing strategy would include a research function 
designed to discover those characteristics of a product upon which the 
consumer bases his purchasing decisions. The Pl'f'JIOtion policies are then 
ade in an attempt to appeal to the attributes valued llOSt highly by the 
public, Such research, however, is often expensive and was completel,y 
beyond the badgetary limitations or the MrTA. One of Gilliam's aost 
re•rkable •rketing ideas concemed the anner in which the researbh upon 
which a promotion str&tegy could be based was to be gathered. As Gilliam 
explainer 
We had long since grown used to borrowing ideas and re-
search from other sources. We had to--we didn't have the 
money to initiate our own studies. So I guess it was natural 
for us to base our promotion strategies on information SUP-
plied by our competition. 
Very simply• what we did was to pay extremely close at-
tention to c&!' promotions. During this particular time rrama. 
auto •nuf'acturers were trying to stress econom;,y and f'uel 
savings. We determined from this tb&t the auto makers--
who could afford research--were .. •ponding to the values held 
by the general piblic. 
our policy decision was to place a low priority on di-
rect pt"0110tional activity. We felt there was no conceivable 
way that a car could compare ravorabI, with transit ~ terms 
of' economy, and that auto promotions were actually adver-
tiseJll!tn*• tor transit in that they stressed trJT.ing to tra-
vel at the least possible cost. In our marketing mix, then, 
we de-emphasized direct promotion and concentrated on pro-
duct planning, pricing, and public information programs. 
What promotion we did use said more or less the same things 
as the auto.mobile ads. 
However, we were constantly aware that our research 
programs should. be improved as soon as it was financially 
possible, In tel'lllS or long-term policy, we embraced the more 
scientific tec~iques of the social sciences as the optimum 
research tool.l 
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In other word.8 • Gilliam determined from the research and promotional et-
forU of bis competition the chare.cteristics of travel that were s~lient 
to the Tul.sa consumer. 
Research Programs 
Despite the detel"Jli.nation that mch of the noral research necessary 
for a promotional strategy could be sidestepped by monitoring the auto 
indu•t1"7, G1lliaa and his staff were aware that product planning must be 
based on sound research. The Lovelock mOdel emphasized developnent of a 
product that will •tch as nearly aa possible the consumer's conception 
ot an ''ideal" form or transport. This suggests it is a responsibility of 
transit •nagement to monitor consumr behavior and attitudaB, and to 
evaluate the credibility of the service in view of the customer's pre-
ferences. Toward that end, Ml'TA created systems for detecting and 
analyzing serYice de .. nds. 
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rassenger ~ Route Analysis 
The implementation of a varied fare collection system made imperative 
the development of a reliable means of obtaining Ml'TA's passenger count 
statistics. 
The oompil.at•on of statistical information concerning 
the daily operations of the Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Auth-
ority has beco• a ditficul t task • • • • The growing popu-
larity of the punch pass combined with the tremendous in-
crease in bus patronage have •de meaningful data hard to ob-
tain. Pu.nob pass passengers are not recorded in the fare box 
and the traditional methods of passenger counting can no 
longer be applied.15 
TWo types of data were viewed as essentials (1) relevant information 
on the socioeconomic data and travel pattera& of pas'sengers; and, (2) rou-
tine passenger counts. In order to obtain these types of data, survey re-
search was adopted. 
As a reseaJ"Ch technique, surveys differ from experimental reseal"Ch 
in that the surveyor has little control over the variables inYolved. 16 , 
A survey attempts to discover relevant variables by asking subjects ques-
tions concerning their activities and their lifestyles. other variables 
dee•d relevant to the behavior being studietl are also explored. Sta-
tistical testing is then used to discover relationships between variables. 
In experimental research, the investigator controls the environmnt 
in such a way that he can alter a variable and observe the attendant varia-
tion in the behavior of the subject. !tlch clearer reationships are of-
ten detectable than is the case with surveys, yet the experimntal tech-
nique is not fully adaptable to transit needs. For one thing, it would 
be extremely difficult to devise an experimental situation in which the 
I 
1111ltitu4e ot variables involved in1. •king trips were controlled. tor this 
reason, M'l'TAchose the technique of survey research. 
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To obtain relevant socioeconomic data, a survey was devised. This 
form was designed by the Indian Nations Council of Governments and ad-
ll:iniatered during late November of 1973. The respondent population con-
sisted mainly of morning peak hour pa.ssengers on all Ml'TA routes. 
The passenger survey provided much needed information on Ml'TA consu-
mers, but a tecbnique~~also was needed that would very quickly reveal daily 
passenger counts and detect significant shifts in demand. In dealing 
with the problem, M'rl'A again resorted to survey research. 
A stratified random survey passenger count .methodology was devised. 
A random sample is one which gives every unit in the population a calcu-
lable (and non-zero) probability of selection. Stratification is a pro-
cess of dividing the population into a number of strata and then drawing 
a random sample from each stratum.17 The population was defined as the 
total number of bus runs on all routes. Then the population was di;vi-
ded according to time of day and direction. Six strata were defined for 
weekdays1 AM Peak Inbound, AM Peak outbound, Midday Inbound, Midday 
Outbouad, PM Peak Inbound, PM Peak outbound. 
Specifically, the strata were defined thusly: 
(1) AM Peak Inbounds- bus trips arriving in the down-
twn area between 7 115 AM and 8 :JO AM; 
(2) PM Peak outbound r bus trips leaving the downtown 
area between 4115 PM and 5 :30 PM; 
(3) AM Peak Outbound r bus trips leaving the downtom 
&l"M between ? : 15 AM and 8: 15 AM; 
(4) PM Peak Inbounds bus trips leaving the end of the 
line between 4 rl5 PM and 5 :30 PM; 
(5) Midday Inbound 1 all non-peak inbound trips; 
(6) Midday Outbound: all non-peak outbound trips. 18 
In addition, Saturday bus runs were stratified into inbound and outbound 
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classifications and recognized as a totally distinct survey_-requirement. 19 
The technique involved pulling a random sample from each str~ta, and 
' I 
then notifying the driver of the selected runs to count all passe:''.lgers 
obarding his bus during the selected time interval. 
A test of this system was made by the author of this study on Mllrch 
27, 1974. The results are fully examined in Appendi.I A. 
~-Passenger Dt.ta Techniques 
As the Ml'TA had adopted an expansion program, reliable information 
channels with the non-riding piblic had to be established. Ml'TA's expan-
sions could not be successful unless the increased bus service met the 
needs and desires of people ~ot riding the bus. In order to attract new 
passengers, route analysis and planning bad to be based on extremely pre-
cise information. 
It has been described how Gilliam relied on an analysis of the com-
petition for guidance in directing prollOtional strategies. But no such 
technique was possible in the area of operations. Market research was 
critically needed to guide the expansion of the MTTA and the automobile 
industry did not provide guidance. 
The most obvious market research technique would have been a com-
munity wide survey that would examine in some detail the travel habits of 
Tulsa's citizens. Such an effort would be extremely costly, and MTTA's 
staff did not pessess sufficient expertise to develop an adequate survey 
questionnaire. The ability to devise an unbiased, reliable form is a 
difficult, expensive task in itself. and the administration of a large 
survey also requires considerable knowledge and ability. The ease with 
which invalid surveys can be devised has led many firms to choose an 
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independent •rket research firm as a means ·of obtaining unbiased and ob-
jective results.20 The expense, however, remains high even when an out-
. aide organization ia consulted. 
The MTTA considered a community-wide •rket surve7 as the optimum 
research tool, but recognized the coats in time and money were prohibi-
tive. Also, there was an inherent problem with large surve7s in that 
they are difficult to repeat. The inherent defect, then, is an inability 
to detect rapid shifts in co111111.1nity opinion. 
These considerations led the .Ml"TA to adopt in principle the transit 
research techniaue of mode preference analysis. Used widely for'transit 
studied in Kansas City, Missouri, the technique was devised as a means of 
analyzing market potential while isolating groups with common destinations 
and origins. The survey tool is based "on the theory that people who 
have oomon trip destination often have common trip origin.1i21 
The basis tool of this technique is a series of attitude surveys 
tb&t relate to •jor trip atB:r&ction areas in a specified region. The 
surveys are statistical in nature. In Kansas City, the surveys were dis-
tributed with the help of •jor employers in the area. The idea was to 
question people from their destinaticm point about their origination 
point.22 
The MTTA did not completely adopt this methodology. Only the theory 
ot comrr..on o:ri.gin and destiri..a.tion was accepted. To implement the theory, 
passenger petition drives were encouraged;, A component or the public 
information program beca• the dissemination of the knowledge that the 
KrTA could be petitioned for new service. Thusly, groups with common 
trip goals were isolated. 
Du.ring 1973 and 1974, petitions containing nearly 2.f 000 names were 
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received at the Ml'TA offices. These petitions led to the expansion of the 
express bus system, to completely new service routes leading to the air-
port industrial area, and, for the first time in Tulsa's tr&nsit history, 
to a crosstown route which did not center on the downtown area, but, in-
stead, linked various residential area shopping centers. 
or course, the use of petitions prevented the use or statistical 
analysis in route planning. But it was determined that petitions en-
couraged a greater passenger involvement in the bus system. Instigators 
of petitions often came to feel they were responsible for the new routing 
and worked to make it successful. .Petition drives o:f'ten created opinion 
leaders among regular passengers who effectively encouraged transit ri-
dership. 
The Results 
The Ml'TA's marketing strategies have been described as being easily 
divisible into two phases. This division conformed nicely to the demands 
of analysis, but in reality no such clear strategical demarcation point 
was evidenced. The two phases or Ml'TA' s marketing strategy were com-
plementary and could just as easily be descrl.bed as a single strategy. 
Certainly, the various programs were designed With the single goal of 
increased patronage in mind. 
It is clear that the theories and practices of Joseph Arnn prepared 
the groundwork upon which a revitalized MTTA was built. Once new equiP-
ment was received, this groundwork was expanded into a fully coordinated 
•rketing strategy that proved beyond question that a transit system can 
ettectively compete in the marketplace against the automobile. 
The results of the Ml'TA efforts were simply incredible. During 
1974, sel'V'ice was increased by 50 per cent over 1973 levels and b3.r 116 
per cent over 1972. Passenger statistics climbed to J.8 million, easily 
outdistancing the 1973 total of 2.6 million and the 1972 count of 2.1 
million. 
The cost of this expansion came high. The amount of tax subsidy 
had to be tripled over a four-yea.r period. But, i'l terms of non-monetary 
gains, the costs of providing the increase in service were more than jus-
tified. The 1.2 million additional passenger trips made in 1974 over 
1973 can be deduced to have been formerly made by automobile. That means 
the Ml'TA 1s expansion mde a considerable dent 1n the total nWllber of auto 
trips made in Tulsa. IJJss air and noise pollution and less congestion 
were the results. Even non-bus riding Tulsans enjoyed the benefits of 
a superior bus system. 23 
The Ml'TA experience· '~o provided support for the contention that 
diffusion theory is applicable to transit operations. The time of the 
adoption process varies among individuals, but many of the characteristics 
of those who adopt innovations very quickly are known. Among the char-
acteristics of early adopters ares higher degree of education1 g~ater 
exposure to communication channels; higher social status; high degree of 
social mobility; possess an economic orientation; possess a favorable at-
titude toward c:riedita generally work 1n specialized occupa.tions. 24 
The passenger survey conducted 1n November of 197) showed that Ml'TA's 
transit prograu were being responded to by a group that was characterized 
by •ny of the above ebaits. Survey questions concerning annual fauaily 
income revealed a high degree of usage by people with incomes over 
$7,000 a year. Nearly half of the respondents indicated they owned a 
motor vehicle which could have been used to make the trip but they chose 
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to take the bus instead; The results, therefore, tended to confirm the 
salience or di:f'tusion theory as a transit •nagement tool. 
The Ml'TA experience, then, indicates clearly that marketing stra-
tegies are effective transit managemnt tools. In addition, communication 
theories, particularly those concerning the diftusion of innovations, can 
proYide theoretical foundations for transit planning and expansion. 
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CHAPI'ER V 
CONCUJSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In any discussion ot the state ot transpo!"tation in the United States. 
the overwhelming dominance ot the automobile must be ac:bdtted. There are 
over 100 million autos registered in the ti.tty states. Almost eighty 
per cent ot U.S. households own at least one car. American auto-makers 
produce one-third ot the world's cars. 1 
The pervasiTeness ot the private car is understood when it is realized 
that 59.4 per cent ot households with an annual income less than $3,000 
own no car, but 76.5 per cent of the workers from these tami.lies get to 
work by automobile. Apparently• carpools are an important form ot trans-
port tor low-income travelers. Public transportation accounts for ll to 
14 per cent of the work trips taken in the United States, and only J.23 
per cent ot the total nUllber of trips. 2 
These figures do not, however, serve as an unqualified endorse•nt 
ot the private car as an inherent part ot the American way of life. In 
•ny cases. car drivers are *'auto .. 0captives" and must use their cars as 
•'transit captives" mat 11&• piblio transportation. Variables such as geo-
graphy, low density, housing, architectural planning, and employment pat-
tems greatly affect the transportation systems of a community.3 And, at 
the top ot any list ot the conditions involved in transportation effec-
ti'V'eness is the attitude and performance or transit manageaent. 
This study bas consistently aruged that the strategies ot the tran-
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sit manager have a direct rel.&tion with the ability of piblio transpor-
tation to attract new passengers. The role of governmental policy in the 
rejuvenation of a tr&nsit system bas not been addressed directly, but is 
clearly of imnense importance. A slight diversion from the JU.in topic is 
therefore justified to expl.&in the role of piblio policy in influencing 
the developnent of transit. 
Governmental Policy 
Clearly one of the most important factors encouraging the popil.&rity 
of the automobile bas been governmental policy. Jaaes s. Gallagher has 
written: 
The present dominance of the automobile as the primary 
mode of urban t:r&mux>rtation has been over 4C' years in the 
building, and is the direct result of more than JO years of 
intensive, sustained research, development, and capital in-
vestment. In the precess, paraJ.tel effort• &nd investment in 
piblic transport all but ceased. 
The disparity between moneys available for highway transportation 
projects and those available for non-highway developments have been iJll-
mens• in the past. For example, the Highway Trust Fund receives an annual 
income ot $6 billion from the four-cent-a-gallon federal gasoline taz. 
And this trust fund has existed for mny years. In contrast, Congress 
passed only in 1974 a bill that will provide $11.8 billion over a six 
year period for transit operating and capital needs. Clearly, "balanced 
transportation" goals are not reflected in funding levels. In the words 
of Edmund H. Mantell: 
As an interesting illustration, one may point to the fact 
that urban re•idents •Y perceive themselves to be incurring 
a self-imposed penalty by selecting a non-highway eonatruction 
alternative. If an urban area selects a non-highway alterna-
tive and the highway funds which they could have received are 
disbursed elsewhere, the urban area residents will not receive 
direct benefits trom the highway user taxes which they have 
paid and which are reserved /&i.,st7 exclusively tor highway 
expenditurea.5 - -
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The policies of goftlrnmental agencies are critically important be-
cause they arrect directly the rate or diffusion for transit throughout 
the COlllllWlity. GoVernmental decisions modify the relative advantages or 
transit over the automobile, thereby encouraging or discouraging the 
adoption or public transportation. 
''The moat accepted assumption regarding the shape of the diffusion 
curve is that the acceptance follows a normal (bell-shaped) curve over 
ti•. ,p This suggests that transit could potentially becom the dominant 
transportation alternative for a target population or could, just as 
easily, be relegated to a minor role. The key variable is the number of 
advantages the transit passenger is allowed to enjoy as opposed to the 
oar driver. And this variable is defined exclusively by governmental 
policy. 
It is known that a considerable time lag is required before an in-
novation becomes widely acc•pted.? Also, the population differs ~n the 
speed at which adoption occurs.8 A community, moreover, has a high degree 
ot population shift which •Y preclude total adoption.9 But none of these 
conditions circwucribes the rate of potential transit acceptance. Only 
governmental policy effectively preTenta widespread diffusion. 
It bas become clear that public transportation is an essential :p1blic 
~ 
sel"V'ioe, just as garbage removal, fire protection, .and police protection. 
It has also beoo• clear that it cannot be !inanced out of the tare box.lo 
Tax subsidies have proven to be essential in most cases, and on+Y when 
these subsidies begin to reach equity with indirect auto subsidies can 
the theoey or ''balanced transportation" beco• a reality. 
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Transit .Management 
Of course, "· • • it is not enough to invest money in piblic trans-
portation 1 the real challenge colll8S in persuading people to use it.nll 
The challenge facing transit management, then, is finding the means of 
att1'9cting sizeable passenger increases as a means of persuading govern-
•ntal entities that more support is justified. 
In this regard, the example of the Ml!ttropolitan Tulsa Transit 
Authority aHwaes an important dimension. .More than any other aspect of 
ope1'9tions, the MTTA emphasized co111111nication: col'JIJl'lW1ication between it-
self and the public, and between and amongst passengers. 
Therefore, the theories of •ss communications have been shown to be 
aapotentiall.7 effective tool in the encouragement of balanced transpor-
tation planning and transit ridership. However, the Ml'TA experie~ce is 
also very clear in pointing to the inherent difficulties in implementing 
a 11&rketing st1'9tegy. Ml'TA. initiated its consumer orientation philosophy 
in early' 1972 and, as of early 1975, the process is not yet complete. Ac-
cording to Janice Pappan, Ml'TA's Manager of Marketing and Service Planning, 
11Hl'TA. has only completed the basic elements of a long term strategy. 
Clearly, Fbase III of our progrua will be as intense ad the previous two 
stages even though the philosophical structure will remain the same. 1112 
Marketing, then, is not a specialized function. It is an orienta-
tion, a methodological structure which, in order to be effective, must 
serve as the basis or the transit operational strategy. Its imple•ntation 
is a slow process which emphasizes flexibility at every stage. The initial 
efforts should not be concentrated in the areas or advertising and pro-
motion but, instead, in the all-important process of Bt1'9tegical formu-
lation. The particular st1'9tegy adopted by a t1'9nsit agency serv*s as 
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a cohesive, unifying force in the creation of markeU.ng programs. 
Again, the example of the MTTA is most enlightening. In its mar-
keting strategies, Ml'TA abandoned a large number of traditional transit 
concepts in favor of the theoretical formulations of the behavioral soi-
enoes. A common sentillent within the transit industry is to regard 
theories possessing an academic taint as being too far removed from the 
realities of day-to-day operations to be useful. Clearly, MTTA found this 
not to be the case. 
In particula~. Ml'TA utilized psychological and sociological theories 
of oonsUJll8r behavior to analyze, predict, and evaluate both present ser-
vice levels and future expansions. The efficiency of the strategy was 
demonstrated by a sizeable increase in passenger totals. 
The critical point is that the behavioral sciences are rich in 
theories that may be applicable to transit policy and that can be effec-
tively utilized in the creation of a marketing strategy. Perhaps a par-
ticular transit agency will determine that diffusion theory has only 
l.i.Jlited applicability to its operations. This fact would not justify 
operating with an inadequate strategical base. other theories exist and 
their applicability needs to be tested. 
If it is assumed that the business of a transit system is not to be 
an operator of equipment but a mover of people, then people, with their 
variety of preferences and annerisms, become the main component in tran-
sit planning. This notion clearly points public transportation in the 
direction of the behavioral sciences. To ignore this basic premise is 
to risk developing a transit network that will not operate to its full 
potential. 
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APPENDIX A 
A STRATIFIED RANDOM PASSENGER COUNT 
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11 
On Hl.rch 2?, 1914, the Ml'TA starr made a count or passengers using 
the stratified ,andom procedure explained in Chapter IV. All runs be-
longing to a certain strata were numbered and then a number or runs from 
each strata were selected by using rand.om selection techniques. 
Figure 2represents the form that was distributed to the drivers or 
the bus runs selected for the su!"Y'ey. All blank spaces except for the 
passenger count total were filled in prior to the distribution to drivers. 
PASSENGER COUNT SURVEY FORM .. 
DATE: DAY1 CODE1 ------------ --------- -------
DRIVER: 
----------------------------------~ 
ROUTE 1 SCH NO: ----------------- -----~------
TIME: TO: ------------------ --~----------~ 
FROM: TO: ------------------ ~---------------
TOTAL PASSENGERS: -----------
PLF.A SE COUNT ALL PASSENGERS (INCWDING TRANSFERS) 
BOARDING YOUR BUS BETWEEN THE ABOVE TWO POINTS, 
DO NOT COUNT PASSENGERS ALREADY ON BOARD AT STAR-
TING POINT. 
Figure 2. MrTA ~ssenger Count Form Used 
With Stratified Procedure 
The results or the sul"V'8y are indicated in Tables II and III. It 
should be noted that the number of samples in each strata are not equal 
due to incomplete returns. 
The man scores or each strata were multiplied by the total number 
ot runs in each strata to determine the total number of passengers. The 
78 
total was determined to be accurate when compared to passenger counts de-


















































































•Strata are defined as 1 AMPI-AM Peak Hour 
Inbound; PMPI-PM Peak Hour Inbound; 
AM.PO-AM Peak Hour Outbound; PMPO-
PM Peak Hour Outbound; MI-Midday 
Inbound; MO-Midday Outbound. Midday 
riln·pepul.ations were larger than 
peak hour strata and therefore ne-
cessitated a sample twice the size 
of the peak hour samples 
The survey revealed soimt surprises. Tr&nsit theory has long held 
that peak hour inbound morning runs are very similar to afternoon peak 
"19 
outbound runs. However, the MrTA survey indicated a correlation of onzy 
.Jl between these two strata. This finding led to a complete investiga-
tion of peak service with the eventual determination that service pro-
Tided in the morning peak did not necessarily need to be provided in the 
afternoon. MrTA service require•nta were altered to eventually require 
a lover number ot buses in the afternoon peaa as compared with the mor-
ning requil"e•nts. The ability.to schedule a reduced number or buses in 
the afternoon resulted in a significant monetary saving. 
TABIE III 
STATISTICAL. ANALYSIS OF PASSENGER SURVEY 
AMP! PMPI AMPO PMPO MI MO 
TOTAL RUNS ?.5 63 63 70 310 313 
MEAN 27.11 9.22 10.90 Jl.90 7.J.5 10.28 
VARIANCE 1.58.86 91.~ 14.32 186.10 47.37 39 • .51 
SD 12.60 9 • .59 3.78 13.64 7.88 6.29 
SE 4.20 3.20 1.20 4.J2 1.6? l.48 
APPENDIX B 
THE Ml'TA PASSENGER SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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TULSA METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT USER STUDY 
The Metropolitan Tulsa Transit Authority and the Indian 
NaUon1 Council of Governments are conducting ~hil 
survey to aueu transit needs in the Tulsa area. Your 
cooperation is appreciated. 
Please CHECK or CIRCLE the appropriate response for 
each question, and return this form when leaving this bu1. 
Where did you board this bus ? 
(nea.rest intersection) 
Between what 
hours did you 
AM PM 
board this bus ? HOUR 6 7 8 9 10 11 lZ 1 z 3 4 ~ 6 
to to to to to to to to to to to to to 
7 8 9 10 11 lZ 1 z 3 4 5 6 7 
uo Uf UIS U'j lU ll l~ u 14 15 lb lt 1D 
Please indicate your approximate address: 
.N s E w 
Hundred Block (Circle One) Street or Avenue 
How far, to the More 
nearest block, did One Two Three Four Five Six Than 
you travel before 
fl [2 ~ f4 rs 16 Six r7 boardinll the bus ? 
What type of fare did Cash Punch Student Token No 
you use to board the 
Ii Parz- f3 f4 Fars bus? 5 
Where will you get off this bus ? 
(nearest intersection) 
How far to the nearest One Two Three Four Five Six More 
block, will you travel 
fl lz f3 f4 Is ~ 
than six 
after leavinll this bus ? r7 
Which of the following Work School Shopping Home Health Other 
best describes the main 
ll rz 13 14 Care nurnos e of this trio? 5 6 
How many days per week Less than 1-Z 3-4 5-6 7+ 
do vou use an MTTA bus? One ri rz 13 14 IS 
Does this trip involve Yes No 


























Was a vehicle available for 
our use to make this tri ? 
What is your auto driving status ? 
How many vehicles are 
Owned by you and/or 
other members of your 
household? 
How many persons are 




























Two Three or 
More 




ZS, 000 & 
Over 
6 33 
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